Civil, Business, Inheritance of Property Matters

Drafting contracts and agreements, MOUs undertakings, settlements relating to civil, business and inheritance matters


We provide advise, consultation and all sorts of solutions for amicable settlement between parties


We represent clients in all types of civil disputes before courts and tribunals, including:  

Breach of Contract Cases, 

Recovery of Money Claims, 

Injunctions & Stay Orders, 

Consumer Protection Cases, 

Defamation & Media Law.Commercial and Trade Transactions

- Cheque Bounce and Dishonour Cases

- Partnership and Profit Sharing Disputes

- Contractual Disputes and Illegal Transfer and Conveyancing

- Gift, Lease, and Tenancy Agreements    

- Inheritance and Family Property Distribution Disputes    

Civil Claims, Cases, Suits, Defences all types 

- SMA, Succession Certificates, and Letter of Administrations


Two parties walk into court claiming they have already settled their dispute. They ask the judge to record their agreement as a decree. But then a third person steps in, arguing: “Wait—I have rights too, and this settlement affects me.” The question: can the court pass a consent decree that binds someone who was never part of the agreement?


Case Title & Citation: 2025 CLC 1237 [Sindh]


Court/Bench: Sindh High Court, Justices Muhammad Junaid Ghafar & [second judge’s name if available]




Facts:




  The dispute began when two private parties reached a mutual settlement regarding property rights and approached the court for recording a consent decree. However, a third party objected, claiming that the settlement directly affected their independent legal rights, even though they were not signatories to the agreement.




Issues:




  The key legal question was: Can a consent decree bind or prejudice the rights of a third party who was not part of the compromise?




The Sindh High Court held that:


 A consent decree is essentially a contract between the parties, endorsed by the court.




It cannot extend beyond the agreement of the parties who sign it.


Importantly, a third party’s independent rights cannot be curtailed by a consent decree between others.


The court emphasized that natural justice requires hearing all affected persons before any binding decree can be passed.


Principle Reaffirmed: Consent decrees bind only the parties to them and cannot prejudice third-party rights.


This judgment carries practical significance for property and civil disputes in Pakistan:


 For litigants, it clarifies that settling disputes amicably is welcome, but such settlements cannot override the rights of people not present in court.


 For third parties, it provides protection against being sidelined by backdoor settlements.


 For lawyers, it highlights the importance of ensuring all stakeholders are properly joined as parties before a consent decree is sought.




Public Takeaway:




If you are affected by a legal dispute—even indirectly—make sure your rights are represented in court. Otherwise, you risk being left out of settlements that could affect your property or interests.




FAQs 




Q1. What is a consent decree?


A consent decree is a court order that records a settlement reached voluntarily between the disputing parties.




Q2. Can a consent decree bind someone who did not sign the agreement?


No. The court clarified that only the parties to the compromise are bound; third-party rights remain protected.




Q3. Why is this case important for property owners?


Because many property disputes involve overlapping claims. This ruling ensures that owners cannot be deprived of rights through private settlements they never agreed to.




Q4. Does the court automatically approve all consent decrees?


Not necessarily. The court must ensure the settlement is lawful, voluntary, and does not harm third-party rights.




Q5. What should I do if I fear being affected by someone else’s consent decree?


You should immediately approach the court as an intervenor or objector to safeguard your rights.



Imagine holding in your hand five cheques worth Rs. 150 million. Each slip of paper promises you a fortune. But when you walk into the bank to cash the first one, you’re met with a cold, stamped message:

“Account Closed.”

Your heart sinks. Before you can even decide your next move, the National Accountability Bureau (NAB) swoops in, arresting both you and the debtor. The cheques—the very evidence of your claim—are taken into custody.

This is not fiction. This is the real-life courtroom thriller of Syed Shah Rafiuddin v. Shah Abdul Raheem & others (High Court Appeal No. 303 of 2024, Sindh High Court, Karachi).

The Promise and the Fall

It all began with a colossal debt: Rs. 317,476,000/-. To settle it, the debtor issued five post-dated cheques totaling Rs. 150 million.

The first cheque was dated 15 July 2014. Months later, on 28 November 2014, it was presented to the bank. That’s when the hammer fell: the account was already closed.

Before the creditor could present the other four cheques, both parties were arrested by NAB, and the original cheques were seized.

Years passed. After being released, the creditor finally filed a summary suit on 14 November 2017 under Order XXXVII CPC, demanding recovery of the Rs. 150 million.

But the courtroom doesn’t run on sympathy. It runs on law—and law has deadlines.

The Clock Ticks – Limitation Strikes

The trial court dismissed the case. Why? Because the creditor had also filed an application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1908 ye—asking for delay to be condoned.

The single judge ruled:

Section 5 does not apply to suits.

 Since the claim was believed to revolve around just one cheque dated 15 July 2014, the suit was declared time-barred.

Case dismissed.

It seemed like the end. Millions lost—not because the claim was false, but because the law of limitation is unforgiving.

The Appeal – A New Hope

The creditor didn’t give up. He appealed before a division bench of the Sindh High Court.

Here, the story took its thrilling turn.

The counsel argued:

1. The limitation should not have been calculated from the date of the cheque but from the date of dishonor (28 November 2014).

2. Even if the first cheque was time-barred, the other four cheques were not. The trial court wrongly dismissed the entire case.

The High Court listened. It examined the plaint. And then came the revelation:

 The trial court had mistakenly treated the case as if it was only about one cheque. In reality, the claim covered all five.

And the law—Order II Rule 3 CPC—permits joining multiple causes of action in one suit if the defendant is the same.

This meant that even if one cheque was dead on arrival, the others were very much alive.

The Suspense – Unpresented Cheques

But the High Court didn’t stop there. It raised a crucial legal puzzle:

The other four cheques were never presented to the bank. Normally, under Section 64 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881, presentment is mandatory.

So could a suit still be maintained?

Here comes the twist: Section 76 of the same Act provides exceptions—if presentment is impossible or unnecessary, for example, where the account itself is closed.


This issue was left open for trial, keeping the suspense alive for the next stage of litigation.

The Climax – Justice Restored

In the end, the High Court delivered its verdict:

The dismissal was set aside.

The suit was restored.

The Appellant was given another chance to pursue justice.

The gavel fell, not on the claim, but on the error of overlooking the bigger picture.

 Lessons from the Case

This judgment is more than just one man’s fight for millions. It carries vital lessons for anyone dealing with cheque disputes, commercial litigation, and limitation law:


1. Limitation law is strict – but also technical. Miscalculating it can cost you your entire claim.

2. Multiple cheques = multiple causes of action – a suit may survive even if one part of it fails.

3. Presentment is not always necessary – especially when the bank account is already closed.

4. Courts can correct errors – but only if you pursue appeals with persistence and solid legal arguments.

Frequently Asked Questions (FAQs)

 1. Can I file a case on a cheque if the bank account is already closed?

Yes. Normally, cheques must be presented. But if the account is closed, courts may treat presentment as unnecessary under Section 76 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881.

2. What happens if my suit is partly time-barred?

Your entire suit will not automatically fail. If you have multiple cheques or debts, courts can allow recovery on the ones still within limitation, even if one cheque is barred.

3. Is Section 5 of the Limitation Act applicable to cheque suits?

No. Section 5 applies to appeals or applications, not to suits. If your suit is time-barred, Section 5 cannot rescue you.

4. From when does the limitation period start for cheque cases?

Under Article 64-A of the Limitation Act, 1908, limitation is 3 years from the date the debt becomes payable, not necessarily the date written on the cheque. Courts sometimes consider the date of dishonor as well, depending on circumstances.

 5. What if NAB or another authority seizes my cheques?

You can still file a case, explaining the circumstances. Courts recognize that certain events—like NAB custody—may prevent presentment, and they examine whether the claim survives under law.

 Final Word

The case of Syed Shah Rafiuddin v. Shah Abdul Raheem teaches us that justice is not just about having the truth—it’s about knowing the law, procedure, and timing.

In commercial disputes, a single misstep in calculating limitation or presenting cheques can mean losing millions. But with persistence, appeals, and sound legal strategy, justice can be reclaimed.

What happens when a tenant stops paying rent but insists they’re “not a tenant anymore”? Can they escape eviction simply by shifting the tenancy agreement to a family member’s name?


This exact situation reached the Lahore High Court (Rawalpindi Bench) in Asif Zahoor v. Muhammad Hanif (2025 CLC 1268) — and the ruling provides a crystal-clear answer on how Pakistan’s rent laws deal with non-compliance and “technical excuses” by tenants.


Case Background


The dispute arose under the Cantonments Rent Restriction Act, 1963.


 In 2018, Asif Zahoor (tenant) entered into a tenancy agreement with Muhammad Hanif (landlord).


 After expiry, a new tenancy agreement was signed — but this time with the tenant’s wife (2020–2025).


 Despite this, Asif Zahoor himself continued to occupy the premises and pay rent directly to the landlord.


When the landlord filed an ejectment application for default in rent and bona fide personal need, the Rent Controller issued a tentative rent order (under Section 17(8) of the Act). Zahoor failed to comply.


His defense? He argued he was no longer the “tenant” — since technically, the new agreement was with his wife.


Key Legal Issue


The core question was:


Does a person who remains in possession and continues paying rent qualify as a “tenant” under the law, even if a fresh tenancy agreement exists in the name of someone else (like their spouse)?


And if so, what happens when such a person fails to comply with a tentative rent order?


The Court’s Ruling


Justice Mirza Viqas Rauf (LHC, Rawalpindi Bench) delivered a decisive ruling:


1. Definition of Tenant (Section 20(j), Act 1963):


 A “tenant” includes not just the original signatory to the tenancy agreement, but anyone who continues in possession or occupation and pays rent, directly or indirectly.


   Even after tenancy termination, heirs and successors who remain in possession are considered tenants.


2. Continued Rent Payments = Continued Tenancy:


    Despite the agreement with Zahoor’s wife, he himself kept paying rent.


   Therefore, the court held that he was still very much a tenant.


3. Non-Compliance with Tentative Rent Order (Section 17(9)):


   Once a tentative rent order is passed, compliance is mandatory.


    If the tenant fails to deposit rent on time, the law leaves no room for delay: defense struck off, eviction ordered, landlord restored to possession.


Result: Zahoor’s appeal was dismissed. His defense was legally untenable, and the eviction order stood firm.


Overview of Tenant Eviction Laws in Pakistan


Case Study: Asif Zahoor v. Muhammad Hanif (2025 CLC 1268)


Understanding Tentative Rent Order in Pakistan


Tenant Rights in Pakistan: Legal Protections & Obligations


Common Landlord and Tenant Disputes in Pakistan Courts


Tenancy Agreement Legal Issues in Pakistan


Lessons from Eviction Cases in Pakistan Courts


Frequently Asked Questions on Tenant Eviction


Conclusion: Protecting Tenant and Landlord Rights in Pakistan


 Why This Case Matters


This ruling is more than just one landlord-tenant dispute. It sets an important precedent for eviction cases in Pakistan:


No Technical Escapes: Tenants cannot dodge eviction by hiding behind paperwork or shifting tenancy to relatives.


Strict Compliance Required: Tentative rent orders are not suggestions; they are binding. Non-compliance = eviction.


Landlords’ Rights Strengthened: Courts will protect landlords from prolonged default situations.


Clarity for Tenants: If you’re in possession and paying rent, you’re a tenant in the eyes of the law — and bound by its obligations.


Practical Insights for Landlords & Tenants


For Landlords:


 Always insist on written tenancy agreements.


 If rent defaults occur, immediately seek a tentative rent order.


 Don’t delay proceedings — the law is on your side when compliance fails.


For Tenants:


 Never ignore a tentative rent order.


 Even if you dispute the tenancy, comply first — fight the legal battle later.


 Understand that possession and rent payments keep you legally bound.


 FAQs on Tenant Eviction Laws in Pakistan


Q1. What is a tentative rent order?


It’s a provisional direction by the Rent Controller requiring the tenant to deposit all due rent plus monthly rent during proceedings.


Q2. What happens if a tenant does not comply?


Under Section 17(9) of the Cantonments Rent Restriction Act, the tenant’s defense is struck off, and eviction is ordered without further trial.


Q3. Can a tenant avoid liability by transferring tenancy to a spouse or relative?


No. If you remain in possession and continue paying rent, you are still legally a tenant.


Q4. Why is compliance with tentative rent orders so strict?


Because rent disputes often drag on for years. The law ensures landlords aren’t left without income while litigation continues.


Q5. What lesson does this case give to property owners?


Always pursue ejectment proceedings confidently. Courts will uphold your rights if the tenant defaults.


Conclusion – The Bigger Picture


Asif Zahoor v. Muhammad Hanif clarifies one thing: rent laws in Pakistan prioritize fairness and accountability. Tenants cannot game the system by playing with technicalities, and landlords have a clear path to justice when faced with default.


For property disputes, this judgment is a strong reminder that compliance with rent orders is the lifeline of tenancy — ignore it, and eviction is inevitable.

Imagine fighting a property case for nearly two decades. Just when you think the issues are settled, the other side brings in new documents—10 years late Should the court allow it?

That was the heart of Muhammad Usman Farooqui v. Abdul Hafeez (HCA No. 189 of 2019, decided on 21 August 2025).

The Sindh High Court had to answer: When can late evidence be admitted in civil proceedings—and what counts as “good cause”?

Case Summary

The dispute arose from a suit for specific performance of an agreement to purchase a 1,000 sq. yard plot (Plot D-12, Block-2, KDA Scheme-5, Karachi).

 The Respondent (Plaintiff) filed the suit in 2006.

Issues were framed in April 2006, and both sides filed their initial documents.

The Plaintiff filed his affidavit-in-evidence in 2010.

Years later, in 2016, the Defendant (Appellant, Muhammad Usman Farooqui) filed an application under Order XIII Rule 2 CPC, seeking to bring in four additional documents:

1. Inquiry report dated 22 March 2006

2. KBCA notice dated 11 February 2006

3. Letter of Advocate Raza Hashmi (2010)

4. Letter of Superintendent, Central Prison Karachi (2010)

The Defendant argued these documents became available later, and were vital to show he was in Central Jail when the alleged agreement was made—making it impossible for him to contract.

But the Single Judge dismissed the application in 2019, holding:

 The documents were filed 10 years late.

 No “good cause” was shown for the delay.

The Defendant appealed under the Law Reforms Ordinance, 1972.

 The Authoritative Ruling (Sindh High Court, 2025)

Justice Mohammad Abdur Rahman, writing for the Division Bench, set aside the 2019 order and allowed the late documents—while balancing fairness to both parties.

Key points from the judgment:

1. Order XIII CPC – The Rule:

  Rule 1 requires all documents in a party’s possession/power to be filed at the first hearing (framing of issues).

  Rule 2 allows late filing if “good cause” is shown.

2. Good Cause ≠ Strict Bar:

   Courts must adopt a liberal approach. If documents are genuine and essential for justice, they can be admitted even after delay, provided no prejudice is caused.

   Precedents: Anwar Ahmad v. Mst. Nafis Bano (2005 SCMR 152), Asghar Ali & Bros v. UBL (1987 CLC 504), and others.


3. Distinction Between Documents:


   Public/official documents (KBCA notice, Inquiry report): should be admitted since they clarify actions of public bodies and don’t unfairly prejudice the other side.

   Prison-related letters: more controversial, as they could be seen as arranged evidence. Still, since evidence had not begun, the Court allowed them—subject to cross-examination.

4. Balancing Prejudice:

   Since the Plaintiff had already filed documents and evidence, fairness required giving him the right to file fresh lists and affidavits to counter the new material.

Final Order:

The Single Judge’s order was set aside.

Defendant’s application allowed.

Both parties permitted to file new lists of documents, witnesses, and affidavits.

Evidence to be recorded de novo by the trial court.

No order as to costs.

Practical Insights

This case is a wake-up call for litigants and lawyers dealing with documentary evidence in civil suits.

1. File Early, File Completely:

   Courts expect all available documents to be filed at the framing of issues. Missing this step invites procedural hurdles.

2. Good Cause = Flexibility, Not Free-for-All:

   If a document truly wasn’t in your possession or power earlier, you may still succeed in adducing it later—but delay must be explained convincingly.

3. Public vs. Private Documents:

   Courts are more open to admitting official records (government notices, statutory reports) than private letters that may look contrived.

4. Fairness is Key:

   Even if late documents are allowed, courts often balance by giving the other side the right to file fresh rebuttals.

5. Strategy Matters:

   Don’t rely on the court’s discretion as a safety net. A weak affidavit or unexplained delay can sink your application.


Frequently Asked Questions (FAQs)


Q1: Can documents be produced late in a civil suit?

Yes. Under Order XIII Rule 2 CPC, documents may be produced later if “good cause” is shown for the delay, subject to the court’s satisfaction.

Q2: What qualifies as “good cause” under Order XIII CPC?

Courts interpret it liberally: genuine documents not earlier in possession, official records, or evidence crucial to determining issues on merit may qualify.

Q3: Will late evidence always be accepted?

Not always. If the court suspects fabrication, or if admitting the evidence unfairly prejudices the other side, the application may be dismissed.

Q4: What happens if late evidence is allowed?

The other party usually gets a chance to file new witness lists, affidavits, or rebuttals, ensuring both sides are treated fairly.

Q5: In specific performance suits, why is evidence timing important?

Because property disputes often hinge on documentary proof. Delay in filing critical documents can shift the balance of the case—or cast doubt on authenticity.

Q6: What’s the safest approach for litigants?

Always submit all available documents at the earliest stage. If new documents emerge, explain their origin and necessity clearly in the affidavit.

Closing Thought

The Muhammad Usman Farooqui v. Abdul Hafeez ruling reinforces a timeless lesson: justice balances truth with fairness.

Yes, courts can allow late documents—but only if delay is explained and the other side gets a fair chance to respond.

For litigants, the message is simple:

Don’t hold back evidence. File early, file fully. Because while courts may forgive delay in rare cases, they never forgive prejudice or bad faith.

In the shadowy alleys of Karachi’s power corridors, where legal battles often unfold behind closed doors, one NAB officer’s vigilance triggered a storm he never saw coming.


It’s 2020. Monsoon rain pelts the city. Inside a drab NAB outpost, Assistant Director Muhammad Umair leads a dawn raid on a key aide of Sharjeel Inam Memon—a powerful political figure and central suspect in a multi-billion-rupee graft scandal.


Within hours, Umair’s team uncovers a treasure trove:  77 original documents —sale deeds, powers of attorney, paper trails connecting the Memon empire to allegedly laundered land worth over Rs6 billion. It’s the kind of find that could send shockwaves through Sindh’s political landscape.


Umair locks the originals in a shared NAB office cabin. Exhausted, he heads home. But by morning, the story flips on its head: fifteen of the most critical documents are gone.


No forced entry. No witnesses. Just silence.


And soon, the hunter becomes the hunted.


Case Summary: From Dawn Raid to Dismissal


The missing documents formed the spine of NAB’s case against Memon, already under the microscope for alleged Rs5 billion embezzlement in the Information Department. Umair, who led the investigation, immediately pressed his seniors to register an FIR, calling the disappearance “theft.”


But NAB’s internal machinery turned inward.


Instead of a criminal investigation, a fact-finding inquiry was launched—an internal probe meant only to gather preliminary facts. Without examining witnesses or cross-examination, it labeled Umair as negligent, accused him of leaking secrets, and cited breach of Section 11.02 of NAB Employees (TCS-2002) Rules.


On June 30, 2021, Umair was removed from service. His appeal was dismissed on November 17, 2021.


A career was dismantled in silence.


But Umair wasn’t done. He took his fight to the Sindh High Court under Article 199 of the Constitution—turning this bureaucratic fallout into a constitutional battleground over Article 10-A: the right to a fair trial.


Inside the Courtroom: A Clash of Legal Narratives


Petitioner’s stance:

Umair’s counsel, Advocate Sarmad Hani, argued that the dismissal was a travesty of due process:


  The cabin where documents were kept was shared and unsecured.

  Another officer with temporary key access faced no action.

  No proper record room existed, violating NAB SOPs.

  The missing originals were redundant anyway; certified copies were on record.


This, he argued, wasn’t negligence—it was system failure. And punishing one officer for that was scapegoating.


  NAB’s response:

NAB’s Special Prosecutor Syed Meeral Shah Bukhari painted a different picture:


, Umair, as custodian, failed to secure evidence.

  He did not escalate the matter immediately.

  His public apology “humiliated the institution.”

  A fact-finding inquiry plus show-cause notice was “enough” under service rules.


The Assistant Attorney General backed NAB, urging the Court to dismiss the petition, arguing that constitutional courts shouldn’t re-try facts.


Authoritative Ruling: The Court Draws the Line


On August 29, 2025, the Sindh High Court issued a landmark ruling in CP No. D-2690 of 2022. Justices Muhammad Karim Khan Agha and Adnan-ul-Karim Memon dissected every layer of the case.


Their focus wasn’t just on missing documents—it was on how Umair was dismissed.


1. Fact-finding is not a regular inquiry.

   Referring to Faisal Ali v. District Police Officer (2025 SCMR 92), the bench emphasized that fact-finding is merely preliminary —it doesn’t allow the accused to present or cross-examine evidence. Major punishments like removal demand a full regular inquiry.


2. Skipping procedure equals injustice.

   In Abdul Qayyum v. D.G. Project Management (2003 SCMR 1110), the Supreme Court held that denying an accused the right to defend is fatal to disciplinary proceedings. Umair’s case fit this pattern.


3. Judicial review polices process—not facts.

   The Court cited Ghulam Murtaza Shaikh v. Chief Minister Sindh (2024 SCMR 1757) to underline that Article 199 isn’t about re-weighing evidence but ensuring no bias, arbitrariness, or bad faith taints the process.


4. Proportionality matters.

   In Ijaz Badshah v. Secretary Establishment (2023 SCMR 407), the Court held that punishment must fit the fault. Dismissing an officer over a theft in an unsecured space was “shockingly disproportionate.”


5. Reasoned orders are mandatory.

   Relying on Shakir Ali v. NAB (2021 PLC (CS) 683), the bench slammed NAB for vague reasoning and lack of justification in bypassing a full inquiry.


  Outcome:


 NAB’s dismissal order and the appellate rejection were quashed.

  Umair was reinstated to his original post with full back benefits.

  NAB was allowed to launch a regular inquiry if evidence warranted—but strictly in line with Article 10-A.


Legal Insight: Why This Case Matters


This isn’t just a service matter. It’s a mirror held up to Pakistan’s disciplinary framework—especially in high-stakes anti-corruption cases.


Here’s what the ruling really drives home:


   Due process isn’t optional. Even powerful institutions like NAB must respect constitutional guarantees.

   Procedural shortcuts backfire.

Fact-finding inquiries are not a substitute for formal proceedings.

   Proportionality is a shield. Courts won’t let punishment outstrip fault.

  Article 10-A has teeth. Since 2012, the right to fair trial applies to all quasi-judicial and departmental forums.

  Employees aren’t expendable. They deserve hearings, evidence, and reasoned orders.


For lawyers and civil servants alike, this case sets a powerful precedent: no one can be dismissed without a fair fight.


Practical Takeaways for Public Servants and Lawyers


1. Never ignore procedural lapses. If your dismissal relies on a fact-finding inquiry alone, that’s a red flag.

2. Invoke Article 10-A early. It’s not just a constitutional slogan—it’s a legal sword.

3. Demand proportionality. Courts are willing to intervene if punishment is excessive.

4. Push for reasoned orders. Vague disciplinary orders are vulnerable on judicial review.

5. Secure documentation & SOP compliance. Even when not at fault, lapses can be used against officers.


And for NAB and similar agencies: this judgment is a wake-up call. Strong cases require strong process—not internal witch-hunts.


Frequently Asked Questions (FAQs)


1. What triggered the missing documents in the Sharjeel Inam Memon NAB probe, and why was Muhammad Umair blamed?


During a 2020 investigation into Memon’s alleged Rs6 billion graft, Umair seized 77 key property documents. Stored in a shared cabin with weak security, 15 originals vanished overnight. Instead of pursuing theft, NAB held Umair liable for negligence under service rules. The Court later ruled this was scapegoating, as certified copies already existed.


2. Why did the High Court rule that a ‘fact-finding inquiry’ was insufficient for dismissal?


Fact-finding is a preliminary step—not a trial. Major penalties require a regular inquiry with evidence, cross-examination, and defense rights (Faisal Ali case). Bypassing this violated Article 10-A and principles of natural justice.


3. How does Article 10-A intersect with service matters like Umair’s?


Article 10-A guarantees a fair trial in all forums, including departmental proceedings (Suo Moto No. 4/2010, PLD 2012 SC 553). Coupled with Article 9 (access to justice), it ensures state institutions respect due process.


4. Can courts intervene in the proportionality of punishment without retrying facts?


Yes. Under Article 199, courts can strike down disciplinary actions if punishment is disproportionate, as in Ijaz Badshah (2023 SCMR 407). They focus on process, not evidence weight.


 5. What broader lessons does this judgment hold for NAB and public servants?


This case reinforces due process. NAB must justify skipping inquiries and issue reasoned orders. Employees gain constitutional protection against arbitrary dismissals.


6. How is this relevant to other legal areas like tenant eviction laws in Pakistan?


Just as eviction cases require procedural compliance—notice, hearings, evidence—disciplinary proceedings must follow due process. Whether it’s property law or service law, skipping steps weakens the state’s case and strengthens the defense.


Conclusion: Procedure Is Power


In a justice system often consumed by politics, the Sindh High Court sent a clear message: no one is above the Constitution—not even NAB.


Muhammad Umair’s reinstatement is more than a personal win. It’s a reaffirmation that due process is the spine of justice in Pakistan.


At Asif Legal Services, we dissect these legal battles with precision—whether it’s a departmental inquiry, a constitutional petition, or tenant eviction laws in Pakistan.


Your case isn’t just paperwork. It’s a story. And every story deserves a fair trial

In a significant ruling by the Supreme Court of Pakistan, delivered on October 17, 2024, in Civil Appeals Nos. 493 and 494 of 2023, the court addressed a contentious property dispute involving two shops in Saidu Sharif, Swat. The case, presided over by Justices Amin ud Din Khan and Shahid Waheed, revolved around a suit for possession and mesne profits filed under Section 8 of the Specific Relief Act, 1877. The Supreme Court overturned the decisions of the Peshawar High Court and the Additional District Judge, Swat, restoring the Trial Court’s dismissal of the plaintiffs’ suit. 


Background of the Dispute


The dispute centered on two shops in Saidu Sharif, Tehsil Babuzai, District Swat, originally claimed to be owned by Badshah Sahib, the former ruler of Swat. Following the integration of Swat into Pakistan in 1972, a Land Inquiry Commission identified properties belonging to Badshah Sahib, including the disputed shops. After his death, the shops were inherited by his sons, Miangul Jahanzeb and Miangul Sultan, who divided the estate amicably. The plaintiffs claimed that Miangul Jahanzeb gifted the shops to Miangul Aurangzeb, who subsequently gifted them to the plaintiffs. They alleged that the defendants, initially licensees, refused to vacate the shops when asked, prompting the suit for possession and mesne profits of Rs. 10,000 per month.


The defendants, however, contended that their father, Rehmani Gul, purchased the shops from Miangul Jahanzeb via a registered sale agreement dated November 12, 1973, and that possession was duly transferred. They argued that the plaintiffs’ claim of a gift was baseless and lacked legal validity.


Procedural History


The Trial Court dismissed the plaintiffs’ suit on June 11, 2010, finding that they failed to prove their title to the shops. On appeal, the Additional District Judge, Swat, reversed this decision on February 1, 2012, accepting the plaintiffs’ claim of ownership based on a purported gift deed and granting the decree for possession. The Peshawar High Court, in its revisional jurisdiction, partially upheld this decree on July 4, 2023, affirming possession but dismissing the claim for mesne profits. Both parties appealed to the Supreme Court: the defendants (C.A. No. 493 of 2023) challenged the possession decree, while the plaintiffs (C.A. No. 494 of 2023) contested the denial of mesne profits.


Core Legal Issue


The Supreme Court framed the central issue as whether plaintiffs, who failed to prove their title to the property, could still obtain a decree for possession by arguing that the defendants lacked a valid title. This question hinged on the application of Section 8 of the Specific Relief Act, which requires plaintiffs to establish their own title to seek possession, rather than relying on the weaknesses of the defendants’ title.


Supreme Court’s Findings


1. Plaintiffs’ Failure to Prove Title:

   The Supreme Court found that the plaintiffs failed to establish their ownership of the shops. They relied on a claimed gift from Miangul Jahanzeb to Miangul Aurangzeb, and subsequently to themselves, but did not produce the critical gift deed to substantiate this transfer. The plaintiffs’ attorney, Nisar Ahmad (P.W.2), and a Senior Clerk, Muhammad Nazir (P.W.1), presented documents, including a notification from 1972 detailing Badshah Sahib’s assets and lists of properties allegedly owned by Miangul Aurangzeb. However, these documents were insufficient, as they were either unverified or did not explicitly mention the disputed shops. The absence of the gift deed was deemed fatal to the plaintiffs’ case, as it broke the chain of title from Miangul Jahanzeb to the plaintiffs.


2. Burden of Proof:

   The court emphasized that under Section 8, the plaintiffs bore the burden of proving their title to justify ousting the defendants. They could not succeed by merely pointing to defects in the defendants’ title. The plaintiffs’ failure to seek a declaration of title, especially in light of the defendants’ claim of a prior sale, rendered their suit for possession untenable. The court noted that when a plaintiff’s title is disputed or clouded, as in this case by the defendants’ 1973 sale agreement, a suit for declaration of title is necessary before seeking possession.


3. Defendants’ Title:

   The defendants supported their claim with a registered sale agreement (Ex.D.W.1/1) from 1973, corroborated by witnesses, including a marginal witness and a clerk from the Tehsil Office. This agreement predated the alleged gift to the plaintiffs’ transferor, casting further doubt on the plaintiffs’ title. The Supreme Court held that it was not required to assess the validity of the defendants’ title, as the plaintiffs did not formally challenge it, reinforcing that the plaintiffs’ case must stand on its own merit.


4. Procedural Oversights:

   The court criticized the plaintiffs’ lack of diligence, noting their failure to call witnesses to substantiate the gift transaction or provide evidence justifying mesne profits. The High Court and Appellate Court erred by misinterpreting the plaintiffs’ claims and overturning the Trial Court’s dismissal without addressing these deficiencies.


Ruling and Implications


The Supreme Court allowed the defendants’ appeal (C.A. No. 493 of 2023), dismissed the plaintiffs’ appeal (C.A. No. 494 of 2023), and restored the Trial Court’s decree dismissing the suit in its entirety. No costs were imposed. The ruling underscores key principles of property law in Pakistan:

- A plaintiff must succeed based on the strength of their own title, not the weaknesses of the defendant’s.

- A suit for possession under Section 8 requires clear proof of title, and a declaration of title is necessary when ownership is disputed.

- Courts cannot examine a defendant’s title unless formally challenged by the plaintiff.


Frequently Asked Questions (FAQs) on Khurshid Ali and Others v. Miangul Adnan Aurangzeb (Deceased) through LRs and Others (2025 SCMR 34)


Based on the Supreme Court of Pakistan's judgment in this case, decided on October 17, 2024, here are five frequently asked questions that arise from the key legal principles discussed, particularly regarding suits for possession under Section 8 of the Specific Relief Act, 1877. These FAQs are drafted to address common concerns in property disputes, drawing directly from the case's facts, reasoning, and holdings.


 1. What was the main issue in the case of Khurshid Ali v. Miangul Adnan Aurangzeb (2025 SCMR 34)?

The primary issue was whether plaintiffs in a suit for possession of immovable property and recovery of mesne profits under Section 8 of the Specific Relief Act, 1877, could succeed despite failing to prove their own title, by relying on the argument that the defendants lacked a valid title or had a defective one. The Supreme Court held that the plaintiffs (respondents in the appeal) could not obtain a decree for possession merely by highlighting weaknesses in the defendants' title. Instead, the plaintiffs must establish the strength and validity of their own title. In this case, the plaintiffs claimed ownership of two shops in Swat through a chain of gifts tracing back to the former ruler of Swat, Badshah Sahib, but failed to produce key evidence like the initial gift deed. The Court emphasized that a suit for possession based on title requires the plaintiff to disturb the status quo only if they prove superior ownership rights, and the suit must fail if they do not.


 2. Why did the Supreme Court rule that the plaintiffs failed to prove their title to the disputed property?

The plaintiffs asserted title through a series of gifts: from Badshah Sahib to his son Miangul Jahanzeb, then to Miangul Aurangzeb, and finally to the plaintiffs via a gift deed dated May 6, 2000. However, the Supreme Court found this chain broken due to insufficient evidence. The plaintiffs produced only two witnesses—an attorney (P.W.2) and a sub-registrar's clerk (P.W.1)—who tendered documents like a 1972 notification of Badshah Sahib's assets and unverified lists of properties. Critically, the gift deed from Miangul Jahanzeb to Miangul Aurangzeb was not presented, rendering the subsequent transfers unproven. Additionally, the 2000 gift deed to the plaintiffs did not explicitly mention the disputed shops, as admitted during cross-examination. The Court concluded that neither the plaintiffs nor their predecessors had established title, and the alleged gifts "never existed" in a legally provable form. This lack of diligence, including failing to call witnesses to substantiate the transactions, led to the dismissal of the suit.


 3. Can a plaintiff in a possession suit under Section 8 of the Specific Relief Act succeed by pointing to defects in the defendant's title, without proving their own?

No, according to the Supreme Court's ruling. The judgment reinforces the established principle that a plaintiff must succeed on the strength of their own title, not the weaknesses or defects in the defendant's title. In this case, the lower courts (Appellate Court and High Court) erroneously granted partial relief to the plaintiffs by focusing on the defendants' alleged lack of title, without requiring the plaintiffs to prove theirs. The Supreme Court clarified that the trial court is precluded from examining the defendant's title unless the plaintiff formally challenges it through a suit for declaration. Here, the defendants claimed ownership via a 1973 registered sale agreement from Miangul Jahanzeb to their father, which predated the alleged gift to the plaintiffs' chain. However, since the plaintiffs did not seek a declaration of title or challenge this sale, the Court could not delve into it. The plaintiffs' failure to prove their own ownership meant they could not oust the defendants or claim mesne profits.


 4. When is a simple suit for possession not maintainable, and what alternative relief should be sought?

A simple suit for possession under Section 8 of the Specific Relief Act is not maintainable if the plaintiff's title is disputed, clouded, or uncertain, as it requires them to prove superior title to justify ejecting the defendant. In such cases, the plaintiff must first file a suit for declaration of title (under Section 42 of the Specific Relief Act or relevant provisions), along with possession and possibly an injunction, to resolve the ownership dispute before seeking ejectment. The Supreme Court in this case held the plaintiffs' suit defective because the defendants' written statement raised a competing title claim via the 1973 sale agreement, creating doubt over the plaintiffs' title. Despite this, the plaintiffs took no steps to amend their plaint or seek a declaration, making the suit incompetent. The Court cited precedents like Taj Wali Shah v. Bakhti Zaman (2019 SCMR 84) and Sultan Mahmood Shah v. Muhammad Din (PLD 2003 SC 1872, as referenced) to underscore that clouded titles necessitate declaratory relief to avoid procedural flaws.


 5. What was the final outcome of the appeals, and what lessons can be drawn for future property disputes?

The Supreme Court accepted the defendants' appeal (C.A. No. 493 of 2023), challenging the decree for possession, and dismissed the plaintiffs' appeal (C.A. No. 494 of 2023), which sought mesne profits. It set aside the decrees of the Peshawar High Court (dated July 4, 2023) and the Additional District Judge, Swat (dated February 1, 2012), restoring the Trial Court's dismissal of the suit in its entirety dated June 11, 2010, with no costs imposed. Key lessons include: (1) Always produce complete documentary evidence, such as all links in a chain of title (e.g., gift deeds), and support claims with witnesses to avoid fatal omissions; (2) In disputed title cases, proactively seek a declaration of ownership rather than relying on a bare possession suit; (3) Demonstrate diligence by justifying claims like mesne profits with tangible evidence (e.g., rental market rates); and (4) Courts will not interfere with possession unless the plaintiff's title is unequivocally proven, protecting the status quo. This ruling serves as a cautionary guide for litigants in Pakistani property law, emphasizing procedural rigor under the Specific Relief Act

Tenant Eviction & Bank Account Freezing Laws in Pakistan | Legal Insights

Learn how the Balochistan High Court ruled against FIA’s freezing of bank accounts during inquiries. Understand tenant eviction laws, money laundering investigations, and your legal rights in Pakistan.

Tenant eviction laws in Pakistan

Eviction procedure Pakistan

Money laundering investigations Pakistan

FIA powers in Pakistan

Freezing of bank accounts Pakistan

Imagine waking up one morning and discovering your bank account is frozen. No court order. No warning. Just a letter from the FIA, claiming you’re “under inquiry.”

For many small traders in Balochistan, this nightmare was real. Their businesses stalled, families suffered, and their right to livelihood was put at risk—all because of a flawed interpretation of FIA’s powers.

In PLD 2025 Balochistan 106 (Abdul Karim v. DG FIA), the High Court finally stepped in. This landmark ruling reshaped how FIA powers and tenant-like protections for financial rights are to be understood in Pakistan.

Case Summary:

Abdul Karim and others challenged an FIA order dated 10th October 2022, which froze their bank accounts in Karachi during an inquiry into alleged money laundering through Hundi/Hawala.

Here’s what happened:

The FIA launched Inquiry No. 69 of 2022 against Munir Ahmed and Ayaz Muhammad.

Petitioners (Abdul Karim and another) were not directly accused of money laundering. Their only “fault” was business dealings with those under suspicion.

Despite no direct evidence, FIA blocked their accounts.

The petitioners approached the Balochistan High Court, arguing that FIA had no legal power to freeze bank accounts at the inquiry stage.

Authoritative Ruling:

The Court delivered a strong, clear ruling:

1. Inquiry vs. Investigation Matters

Inquiry = seeking information.

Investigation = formal evidence gathering.

Freezing accounts can only happen during investigation—not inquiry.

2. Jurisdiction is Local

    Under Section 177 Cr.P.C., cases must be tried in the territory where the alleged offence occurred.

   Karachi FIA could not freeze Quetta businessmen’s accounts without jurisdiction.

3. FIA Powers are Limited

   Section 5(5) FIA Act, 1974 allows freezing only in urgent cases during investigations—and even then, subject to court approval.

   The Assistant Director FIA Karachi acted beyond his authority.

4. Fundamental Rights Protected

   Arbitrary freezing of accounts violates Articles 4, 9, 18, 23, 24, and 25 of the Constitution.

   Citizens’ right to trade, livelihood, and property must be safeguarded.

Verdict: The FIA’s seizure letter was declared a nullity in law. Both petitions were allowed.

Practical Insights:

For Citizens & Businessmen:

  If your account is frozen during an inquiry, challenge it immediately. FIA cannot block it unless there is a proper investigation and court approval.

For Lawyers:

  This judgment reinforces the importance of procedural safeguards. Always distinguish between inquiry and investigation when challenging FIA actions.

For Policy Makers:

The Court’s call for a localized approach is critical. Centralized investigations in Karachi or Islamabad unfairly burden citizens of other provinces.

For Tenants & Eviction Cases:

  While this case was about FIA powers, the principle applies broadly: due process is non-negotiable. Just as landlords must follow legal eviction procedures under tenant eviction laws in Pakistan, agencies like FIA must respect limits on their powers.

FAQs on Tenant Eviction & Account Freezing in Pakistan

Q1: Can FIA freeze my bank account without notice?

No. The FIA cannot freeze your account during an inquiry. Even during investigation, it requires court permission and must justify urgency.

Q2: What should I do if my account is frozen unlawfully?

File a constitutional petition in the relevant High Court. Courts have consistently struck down FIA’s unlawful account freezing orders.

Q3: How does this case connect to tenant eviction laws?

Both areas of law emphasize due process. Just as a landlord must follow eviction procedure under tenant eviction laws in Pakistan, FIA must follow legal procedures before freezing accounts.

Q4: Can FIA summon me to Karachi if I live in Quetta?

No. The Court stressed that investigations should be localized. You cannot be forced to defend yourself outside your local jurisdiction.

Q5: Are tenants in Pakistan similarly protected from arbitrary eviction?

Yes. Under tenancy laws, landlords cannot evict tenants without proper legal grounds, notice, and court approval—paralleling the due process required in freezing financial assets.

Q6: Does this ruling weaken FIA’s fight against money laundering?

Not at all. It simply ensures that citizens’ rights are not violated while FIA performs its duties. Lawful investigations remain fully valid.

Conclusion:

The Abdul Karim case is a landmark reminder that rule of law is about balance. Agencies like FIA exist to protect the financial system—but their powers must not trample on individual rights.

Just as tenant eviction laws in Pakistan ensure no family is thrown out without due process, this ruling ensures no trader’s account is frozen without lawful authority.

Bottom line: Procedure is protection. Whether it’s eviction from property or freezing of bank accounts, the law stands as a shield for citizens when authorities overstep.

Summary suits in Pakistan are not just about plaintiffs and Defendants—they are also about how strictly courts enforce honesty and compliance in litigation. A recent decision of the Lahore High Court, Multan Bench (2025 CLC 1580), gives us a striking reminder: when the law grants you a chance to defend yourself, you must meet the conditions truthfully. Any fraud—even a forged surety bond—can strip away your entire defense.

This ruling not only shapes recovery suits under Order XXXVII CPC but also impacts how summary suit disputes are fought across Pakistan. Let’s break it down.


Case Summary: Muhammad Irsalan Faraz v. Habib ul Rehman (2025 CLC 1580)

The case began when Habib ul Rehman (plaintiff) filed a summary suit for recovery of Rs. 70,00,000/- under Order XXXVII CPC against Muhammad Irsalan Faraz (defendant).

The defendant sought leave to defend —a requirement in summary suits.

The trial court allowed it, but with a condition: the defendant must submit surety bonds worth Rs. 70 lakhs.


The defendant produced the surety bonds, but the plaintiff later alleged they were forged.


After a detailed inquiry (including testimony from the patwari), the trial court confirmed that the bonds were fake.

Result?

 The court recalled its earlier order granting conditional leave.

The defendant’s right to defend was dismissed.

FIR proceedings were also directed against him and the surety.

The defendant argued before the High Court that he should have been allowed to submit a fresh surety. But the High Court rejected this plea, ruling that fraud had already tainted his defense.


Authoritative Ruling

Justice Raheel Kamran, J. held:


1. Conditional leave is effective only if fulfilled in true letter and spirit.

   If the condition is not met, the order becomes inoperative.


2. Submitting a forged surety bond is fraud, not a minor lapse.

    Fraud strikes at the very root of judicial proceedings.


3. Trial courts have discretion under Order XXXVII, Rule 3(2) CPC to grant leave with conditions. Non-compliance makes the defendant lose the right to defend.

4. Fraud benefits the wrongdoer —and in this case, the only beneficiary of the fake surety bond was the defendant himself.

Thus, the High Court dismissed the revision petition, endorsing the trial court’s strict approach.


Practical Insights for Plaintiffs and Defendants


This ruling has real implications for anyone involved in summary suit laws in Pakistan and summary suits for  recovery of money:


For plaintiffs: The law favors speedy resolution in summary suit disputes. If a defendant relies on forged documents, the court will not hesitate to dismiss their defense and grant you relief.


For defendant: Leave to defend is a privilege, not a right. Courts expect complete honesty. A single false step—like producing a forged surety or false bond—can wipe out your entire case.


For lawyers: Always advise clients that compliance with conditions in summary suits is non-negotiable. Courts treat fraud as a direct attack on the judicial process.


For the justice system: This case reinforces a zero-tolerance policy toward fraud, strengthening landlord protections in recovery cases.


Key Takeaways

Order XXXVII CPC allows courts to grant conditional leave to defend in recovery cases.

Conditional leave is void if the condition is breached or fraudulently met.

Fraud on the court (e.g., forged surety bonds) results in dismissal of defense and possible criminal proceedings.

Defendant facing summary suit proceedings must approach the court with clean hands—no shortcuts, no forged documents.


Frequently Asked Questions (FAQs)


1. What is “conditional leave to defend” in summary suits under Pakistani law?

It’s when the court allows a defendant to defend the case, but only if they meet a condition—such as depositing money or submitting a surety bond. If the condition isn’t fulfilled, the defense becomes invalid.


2. How does this case affect summary suit disputes in Pakistan?

It shows that courts won’t tolerate defendants relying on false or forged documents. In eviction or rent recovery cases, fraud can instantly destroy the defendant's defense and speed up the plaintiff's decree.


3. Can a defendant replace a defective or false surety bond with a new one?

Not if the earlier bond was proven fraudulent. Courts treat fraud as fatal—it cancels the defense entirely. This case confirms that once fraud is established, there is no second chance.


4. What should a plaintiff do if they suspect a defendant has submitted forged documents?

File an application before the trial court. Courts can hold inquiries, summon patwaris/officials, and if fraud is proven, recall the leave order and even initiate criminal proceedings against the defendant.


5. How does this ruling strengthen summary suit laws in Pakistan?

It ensures that the eviction process remains swift and fair. By penalizing fraud, courts protect landlords from delay tactics and reinforce that eviction disputes must be resolved honestly.


Final Word


Summary suit laws in Pakistan are designed to ensure quick justice, especially under summary procedure suits (Order XXXVII CPC). But this case shows that the privilege of defending such suits is fragile—built on the foundation of honesty.


For defendant in summary suit: Don’t gamble with fake documents.


For plaintiff: Know that the law is firmly on your side if the defendant in a summary suit plays foul.


In the end, the court’s message is clear: fraud and justice cannot coexist.

(A Legal Thriller with a Powerful Lesson on Evidence and Justice)


You rent out a shop. Papers are signed. Rent is agreed. Life moves on.

But then—when you ask the tenant to vacate—the story takes a dark turn.


The tenant stands up in court and says:

“I am not your tenant. The agreement is fake.”


The landlord is shocked. He produces the tenancy agreement.


But the Rent Tribunal isn’t convinced.

“Where are the witnesses? Without them, this paper means nothing.”


Eviction? Denied.


But the landlords don’t give up.


They appeal. The Additional District Judge sees it differently:

“Rent Tribunals don’t follow strict evidence rules. This document stands.”

Eviction? Granted.

Relief at last? Not yet.


The tenant fights back in the High Court. And once again—the agreement is thrown out. The reasoning? Articles 17 and 79 of Qanun-e-Shahadat require both attesting witnesses to prove such a document. Since they weren’t produced, the tenancy was declared unproven.

Checkmate? It seems so.


But then—the case reaches the Supreme Court of Pakistan.

Justice Mansoor Ali Shah asks the crucial question:

Must every disputed tenancy agreement be proved under strict Qanun-e-Shahadat rules—even when the Rent Tribunal law says otherwise?”

And here comes the climax:

The Court rules that while Rent Tribunals are not bound stricto sensu by Qanun-e-Shahadat, they must still apply its general principles to ensure fairness. A tenancy agreement can be proved on the balance of probabilities, not through rigid technicalities.

The evidence—original deed, corroborating witnesses, ownership record—tipped the scales. The tenancy was proven. The eviction was restored.

Lesson:


In rent disputes, technicalities won’t overshadow truth. Courts ensure fairness, protect landlords’ rights, and stop tenants from abusing loopholes.


Frequently Asked Questions (FAQs)


1. Do Rent Tribunals follow the Qanun-e-Shahadat strictly?

No. Section 34 of the Punjab Rented Premises Act, 2009 excludes strict application. However, general principles—like fairness, relevance, and reliability of evidence—still apply.


2. Is it mandatory to produce both witnesses to prove a tenancy agreement?

Not always. While Articles 17 and 79 of Qanun-e-Shahadat require it in civil suits, Rent Tribunals decide on a balance of probabilities. If other strong evidence exists, the agreement may still be upheld.


3. What if a tenant denies the tenancy altogether?

The landlord must present convincing evidence: the written tenancy agreement, corroborating testimony, and ownership records. Courts generally presume the property owner to be the landlord.


4. Can a landlord evict a tenant for personal use?

Yes. If the landlord proves a genuine need for personal use (for example, starting a business), the court may order eviction—even if the tenant objects.


5. What is the standard of proof in rent matters?

Unlike criminal cases (where proof beyond reasonable doubt is needed), rent cases use the preponderance of probability standard—whichever side’s evidence is more convincing will succeed.



Crescent Star Insurance Ltd. v. Eduljee Dinshaw Pvt. Ltd. (2025 MLD 1340)

A Landmark Judgment on Fixation of Fair Rent under Section 8 SRPO

 Introduction

Rent disputes are among the most common battles fought in the courts of Pakistan. When property values rise but tenants continue to pay decades-old rents, friction is inevitable. On the other hand, landlords often demand exorbitant hikes, leaving tenants struggling to survive. The law tries to strike a balance between these competing interests.

A recent judgment of the Sindh High Court in Crescent Star Insurance Limited v. Eduljee Dinshaw Pvt. Ltd., reported as 2025 MLD 1340, revisits the scope of Section 8 of the Sindh Rented Premises Ordinance, 1979 (SRPO). The case highlights how courts determine “fair rent” and clarifies that even a single proven factor under Section 8 can justify rent enhancement.


Let’s unpack the case, its arguments, and the legal principles that flow from it.



 Facts of the Case


1. The Property


    The disputed premises are located at I.I. Chundrigar Road, Karachi, the city’s financial hub.

    Existing rent: Rs. 6.5 per sq. ft.

    Premises area: 5,746 sq. ft.

    Total monthly rent: a meagre Rs. 37,349/-.


2. The Landlord’s Case


    Filed Rent Application No.1187/2018 under Section 8 SRPO.

    Demanded enhancement to Rs. 201.31 per sq. ft. by relying on a compromise agreement of another building (Adamjee House) in the vicinity.

    Cited 500% increase in government taxes and rise in construction costs.


3. The Tenant’s Defence


    Crescent Star Insurance argued that the building was in a dilapidated condition, maintained at their own expense.

    Claimed the structure was at risk of collapse.

    Asserted that enhancement was unjustified and excessive.

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Decisions of the Courts Below

Rent Controller (25.08.2020)

   Allowed the application partially.

   Fixed rent at Rs. 40 per sq. ft. (≈ Rs. 229,840 per month).

   Applied Section 9 for future enhancements.

First Rent Appeal (16.03.2020)

   Dismissed the tenant’s appeal.

High Court (20.03.2025)

   Petition dismissed.

   Held that the tenant failed to prove the building’s dilapidated condition.

   Found sufficient grounds for rent increase based on taxes and comparative rental value.

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Key Legal Principles from the Judgment

1. Section 8 SRPO – Fair Rent Criteria

   Rent Controller considers:

    (a) Rent of similar premises in the locality.

    (b) Rise in cost of construction/repairs.

    (c) Imposition of new taxes.

    (d) Annual value for property tax purposes.

   Importantly, all four factors need not co-exist. Proving even one is enough.

2. Burden of Proof on Tenant

    If the tenant claims “dilapidated condition,” evidence is mandatory (inspection reports, expert testimony, photographs).

    Mere statements in pleadings are insufficient.

3. Timing of Enhanced Rent

    Enhancement can be effective from the date of the rent application—not from the date of decision.

4. Maintenance Obligations

    Tenant admitted that building maintenance was their responsibility, weakening their stance.

5. Precedents Relied Upon

   LAlay Javed Zaidi v. Habibullah (PLD).

   State Life Insurance v. British Head & Footwear Store (2024 SCMR 781).

   Haque Traders v. Sheikh Abid & Co. (PLD 2024 SC 918).

   Akhtar Kamran v. Pervaiz Ahmed (MLD 2018).

 Analysis

This case is a textbook example of how courts navigate between landlords’ right to fair return and tenants’ protection against arbitrary hikes.

 The landlord demanded Rs. 201.31—clearly inflated.

 The tenant clung to “dilapidated condition”—but without evidence.

 The Rent Controller struck a middle ground: Rs. 40 per sq. ft., balancing fairness and economic reality.

By dismissing the constitutional petition, the High Court reinforced that concurrent findings of fact by Rent Controller and appellate court are rarely interfered with unless perverse or arbitrary.

This ensures judicial consistency and discourages frivolous constitutional challenges in rent cases.

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Broader Implications

1. For Landlords

    Keep documentary proof of rising costs, taxes, and comparable rentals.

    Don’t overinflate demands—courts will cut down unrealistic figures.

2. For Tenants

    If claiming poor building condition, gather concrete evidence.

    Remember: maintenance is often the tenant’s responsibility.

    Courts won’t protect “cheap enjoyment” if market realities demand adjustment.

3. For Businesses

    Long-term leases on prime locations may become costly.

    Fair rent ensures landlords are not exploited, while tenants are not priced out unjustly.

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Conclusion

The Crescent Star Insurance case underlines a crucial truth: fair rent is about balance, not extremes. Courts won’t blindly accept landlords’ sky-high demands nor tenants’ hollow claims of disrepair. Instead, they’ll weigh the statutory factors under Section 8 SRPO and arrive at an equitable figure.

For anyone involved in a rent dispute, the lesson is clear: bring evidence, not just arguments.

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 FAQs on Fair Rent under Section 8 SRPO

Q1. What is “fair rent” under Section 8 of SRPO?

Fair rent is the rent determined by the Rent Controller after considering comparative rentals, rise in construction costs, imposition of taxes, and property valuation. It prevents landlords from overcharging and tenants from underpaying.

Q2. Do all four factors of Section 8 have to be proved?

No. Courts have consistently held that even one proven factor (e.g., increased taxes) is sufficient to justify fixation of fair rent.

Q3. Can tenants also file for fixation of fair rent?

Yes. Section 8 allows both landlords and tenants to approach the Rent Controller—landlords for enhancement, tenants for protection against exorbitant demands.

Q4. From when does enhanced rent apply—the date of decision or filing?

Enhanced rent usually applies from the date of filing the application, not from the date of judgment.

Q5. What happens if a tenant claims the building is dilapidated but provides no proof?

Such a claim will be rejected. Courts require concrete evidence like inspection reports, photographs, or expert opinions. Mere allegations are not enough.

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